There are no simple answers to the complex political and economic questions of our time.
I realise this anew every week when I open yet another email from the Commercial Agricultural Union (CFU) announcing the passing away of yet another member, matching a name to a face; yet another infirm aged person who had been struggling in a neglected home for the aged or hospital bed to pay for medical care and make ends meet financially. Every one of them had hoped that compensation for farms, livestock, crops and implements expropriated without compensation since 2000 would become a reality within their lifetime, alleviating their distress.
Victims of expropriation without compensation in Zimbabwe every day ask: “Should we accept a less-than-ideal compensation settlement? Or should we keep fighting in Zimbabwean and South African courts, in regional tribunals and international forums until we can negotiate a fair and equitable outcome?” Questions such as these do not have simple answers.
There is no ideal settlement if one is negotiating oneself out of a deep-rooted conflict. In the hustle and bustle of give-and-take agreements all parties sacrifice more than they are comfortable with, to gain less than what they would have liked to get. The CFU has calculated that improvements on expropriated farms that the ZANU-PF government now is prepared to pay for are worth approximately 5,2 billion US dollars. The settlement value of $3,5 billion signed for in July 2020 is two-thirds of this amount.
The question is rather: should one kick for goal when the slightest gap presents itself, or is it worth one’s while to wait for another ten or fifteen years for a better opportunity while fighting for one’s rights on every possible platform? What are the accompanying financial, economic, political, social and reputational risks?
However, for Zimbabwean farmers it need not be an or, it could also be an and. Reach an uneasy compromise and maintain the moral high ground by subscribing to an imperfect negotiated settlement on compensation, while at the same time challenging the unjustness in South African and international courts and tribunals, media and policy-making bodies. Where the local agricultural structure is unable to do so because of the provisions of the settlement agreement, another representative vehicle may be used.
The option to fight is exhausting, costly, time-consuming and drains one’s resources. External assistance is required, but so far it has yielded results. In November 2008 the Southern African Development Community (SADC) tribunal handed down an epoch-making judgment against the Zimbabwean government’s land grabs. Although it resulted in the dissolution of the tribunal by the SADC summit in 2012 (following a process in which the South African government played a not insignificant role), the judgment was recorded in South African law and in September 2015 Zimbabwean property in Cape Town was attached and sold to cover outstanding legal expenses. This week, a further case was heard in the North Gauteng High Court, testing the South African government’s accountability for losses suffered because of its involvement in the dissolution of the SADC tribunal. Judgment in this case was reserved.
The confrontation route, especially in the international and legal arenas, relies heavily on Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in Washington and Brussels mostly dictates the debate on aid to Zimbabwe. During the Green Week in Berlin in January this year I facilitated a meeting between a senior official of the World Bank and the late Minister Perrance Shiri of Zimbabwe, during which the intention to pay compensation, the buy-in of affected farmers and possible access to a loan for this purpose were discussed. The official said he was representing a bank, not a charity, and that they were looking at the ability to repay, the track record of repaying previous debt, and the ability of the current policy environment to bring about growth and prosperity. He was sceptical about Zimbabwe’s profile on any of those criteria.
The largest single problem regarding the Zimbabwean compensation settlement is that they do not have funds to honour it, and they do not yet know where to get it. Half of the $3,5 billion is payable before July 2021.
If land reform in Zimbabwe sneezes, South Africa and Namibia also catch a cold. The principles applying in the Zimbabwean compensation settlement become a format for the rest of the region, and this is why it is important for every South African farm owner to keenly watch developments in that country. It is important to see how, where, what and when compensation is paid and why.
Payment is made for improvements only, not for the land, except to “indigenous Zimbabweans” and farmers covered by Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPPAs) (citizens of South Africa, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and seven others). This gives more rights to foreign investors than to Zimbabwean citizens. It means saying to white Zimbabweans they are in fact “not from here”, granting them second-class citizenship.
It sidesteps the Zimbabwean state’s involvement in and benefitting from the establishing of the “unacceptable distribution of land ownership” by always having registered ownership in a deeds registry and levying transfer duties.
But no injustice is ever final.
Should expropriated Zimbabwean farmers accept the settlement agreement? Their average age is more than 80 years. They should accept the compensation offered, opening the door for Zimbabwe to resume its role as a highly competitive agricultural producer. They should again become the showpiece of the world’s beef, tobacco, cotton and cut flower industries, creating the prosperity that can pull their country from its abject poverty.
However, in doing so they should not neglect the confrontation options!
* Dr Theo de Jager is the board chairperson of Saai and President of the World Agricultural Organisation.
Waar laat vergoeding die Zimbabwiese boere?
Daar is geen eenvoudige antwoorde op die komplekse politieke en ekonomiese vrae van ons tyd nie. Ek besef dit opnuut elke week as ek weer ’n e-pos van die Kommersiële Landbou-unie (CFU) oopmaak waarin hulle die afsterwe van nog ’n lid aankondig, en die naam by ’n gesig plaas; nog ’n verswakte bejaarde wat in ’n verwaarloosde ouetehuis of hospitaalbed gesukkel het om vir mediese versorging te betaal en finansieel sy punte bymekaar te kry. Elkeen van hulle het gehoop dat vergoeding vir plase, vee, oeste en toerusting wat sedert 2000 sonder vergoeding onteien is, nog in hulle leeftyd sou realiseer, en die nood sou verlig.
Slagoffers van onteiening sonder vergoeding in Zimbabwe vra daagliks: “Behoort ons met ’n minder-as-ideale vergoedingskikking tevrede te wees? Of moet ons aanhou om in Zimbabwiese en Suid-Afrikaanse howe, in streektribunale en internasionale forums te baklei totdat ons ’n billike en regverdige uitkoms kan beding?” Sulke vrae het geen eenvoudige antwoorde nie.
Daar is nie ’n ideale skikking wanneer mens ’n weg uit ’n diepgewortelde konflik uit onderhandel nie. In die hamermeule van gee-en-neem-ooreenkomste offer almal meer op as waarmee hulle gemaklik is, om minder te wen as wat hulle wou gehad het. Die CFU het bereken dat verbeteringe op onteiende plase, wat die ZANU-PF-regering nou bereid is om uit te betaal, ongeveer 5,2 miljard Amerikaanse dollar werd is. Die skikkingswaarde van $3,5 miljard wat in Julie 2020 onderteken is, is twee derdes daarvan.
Die vraag is eerder: moet daar na die doelhok geskop word wanneer die geringste gaping hom voordoen, of is dit die moeite werd om nog tien of vyftien jaar te wag vir ’n beter geleentheid en intussen op elke moontlike platform vir jou regte te baklei? Wat is die finansiële, ekonomiese, politieke, sosiale en reputasierisiko’s wat daarmee gepaard gaan?
Vir Zimbabwiese boere hoef dit egter nie ’n óf te wees nie, dit kan ook ’n én wees. Tref ’n ongemaklike kompromie en behou die morele hoë grond deur ’n onvolmaakte onderhandelde skikking oor vergoeding te onderskryf, terwyl jy terselfdertyd in Suid-Afrikaanse en internasionale howe en tribunale, media en beleidmakende liggame die ongeregtigheid aanval. Waar die plaaslike landboustruktuur weens die inhoud van die skikkingsooreenkoms dit nie kan doen nie, kan ’n ander verteenwoordigende voertuig daarvoor gebruik word.
Die veg-opsie is vermoeiend, duur, tydrowend en tap jou hulpbronne. Hulp van buite is daarvoor nodig, maar tot dusver het dit resultate gelewer. In November 2008 het die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap (SAOG) -tribunaal ’n epogmakende uitspraak teen die Zimbabwiese regering se grondgrype gelewer. Alhoewel dit daartoe gelei het dat die tribunaal in 2012 deur die SAOG-beraad ontbind is (ná ’n proses waarin die Suid-Afrikaanse regering geen geringe rol gespeel het nie), is die uitspraak in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geregistreer en is daar in September 2015 op Zimbabwiese eiendom in Kaapstad beslag gelê en is dit opgeveil om uitstaande regskoste te dek. Vandeesweek is ’n verdere saak in die Noord-Gautengse Hooggeregshof aangehoor waarin die Suid-Afrikaanse regering se aanspreeklikheid getoets is vir verliese wat vanweë sy betrokkenheid by die ontbinding van die SAOG-tribunaal gely is. Uitspraak in dié saak is voorbehou.
Die konfrontasieroete, veral in die internasionale en regsarenas, leun swaar op Artikel 17 van die Universele Deklarasie van Menseregte, wat in Washington en Brussel meestal die debat oor hulp aan Zimbabwe dikteer. Tydens die Groenweek in Berlyn in Januarie vanjaar het ek ’n gesprek tussen ’n senior amptenaar van die Wêreldbank en wyle minister Perrance Shiri van Zimbabwe gefasiliteer waartydens die voorneme tot vergoeding, die inkoop van geaffekteerde boere en moontlike toegang tot ’n lening daarvoor bespreek is. Die amptenaar het gesê hy verteenwoordig ’n bank, nie ’n welsynorganisasie nie, en dat hulle kyk na die vermoë om terug te betaal, die baanrekord van terugbetaling van vorige skuld, en die huidige beleidsomgewing se vermoë om groei en welvaart teweeg te bring. Hy was skepties oor Zimbabwe se profiel op enige van daardie kriteria.
Die grootste enkele probleem met die Zimbabwiese vergoedingskikking is dat hulle nie die geld het om dit uit te voer nie, en nog nie weet waar om dit te kry nie. Die helfte van die $3,5 miljard is betaalbaar voor Julie 2021.
As Zimbabwiese grondhervorming nies, kry Suid-Afrika en Namibië ook verkoue. Die beginsels wat in die Zimbabwiese vergoedingskikking geld, word ’n formaat vir die res van die streek, en daarom is dit vir elke Suid-Afrikaanse plaaseienaar belangrik om verwikkelinge aldaar dop te hou. Dit is belangrik om te kyk na hoe, waar, wat en wanneer vergoeding betaal word en waarom.
Net verbeteringe word uitbetaal, nie die grond nie, behalwe aan “inheemse Zimbabwiërs” en boere wat deur Bilaterale Beskerming van Beleggingsooreenkomste (BIPPA’s) gedek word (Suid-Afrikaners, Switsers, Hollanders, Duitsers, Dene en sewe ander). Dit gee aan buitelandse beleggers meer regte as aan Zimbabwiese burgers. Dit sê aan wit Zimbabwiërs dat hulle eintlik “nie van hier is nie”, en ken ’n tweedeklasburgerskap aan hulle toe.
Dit pypkan die Zimbabwiese staat se betrokkenheid en voordeel uit die totstandkoming van die “onaanvaarbare verspreiding van grondeienaarskap” deurdat hulle deurlopend eienaarskap in ’n aktekantoor geregistreer en oordragbelastings daarop gehef het.
Maar geen ongeregtigheid is ooit finaal nie.
Moet onteiende Zimbabwiese boere die skikkingsooreenkoms aangryp of nie? Hulle gemiddelde ouderdom is oor die 80 jaar. Hulle moet die vergoeding wat aangebied word vat en daardeur die deur oopmaak vir Zimbabwe om weer sy rol as ’n hoogs mededingende landbouprodusent te herstel. Hulle moet weer die vertoonvenster van die wêreld se beesvleis-, tabak-, katoen- en snyblombedrywe word, en die welvaart skep wat hulle land uit sy nypende armoede kan trek.
Hulle mag in die proses egter nie die konfrontasie-opsies afskeep nie!
* Dr. Theo de Jager is die direksievoorsitter van Saai en president van die Wêreldlandbou-organisasie.
