The future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) is increasingly uncertain as US industrial policy becomes more nationalistic and securitised, particularly in response to shifting geopolitical, trade and domestic priorities.
Established in 2000, Agoa offers duty-free access to the US market for certain products from eligible sub-Saharan African countries, to encourage economic growth and foster US-Africa relations. However, current and future US policy trends could affect Agoa’s trajectory, potentially damaging African economies.
Several concerns are generating anxiety among African policymakers.
The first is the ongoing shift in US industrial and trade policy. Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, economic nationalism has dominated. US trade has increasingly focused on reshoring supply chains, reducing reliance on foreign production and securing critical industries, particularly in response to competition with China. This could reduce the focus on initiatives like Agoa, especially if they don’t align with US goals of boosting domestic production and securing supply chains.
Moreover, US trade policy is increasingly viewed through a security prism, meaning Africa’s positioning is under greater scrutiny. Should African countries be perceived as drifting into the orbit of China, Russia or other non-Western powers, that could lead to a reassessment of trade incentives under Agoa. South Africa’s “Lady R” debacle offers a clear example. Agoa’s future may be linked to how African countries align with US geopolitical interests.
Another subtle shift has been the US preference for bilateral trade deals under recent administrations, which could undermine regional programmes like Agoa. The strategic trade and investment partnership with Kenya is a case in point, aimed at strengthening ties with nations where the US feels it can exercise more meaningful influence.
The second area to watch is the upcoming US election, which will undoubtedly shape the future of US-Africa trade relations. Under a Trump administration, with its “America First” mantra, trade policy would likely be insular and transactional. Given Trump’s scepticism of multilateral frameworks, Agoa’s continuation could be legitimately under threat.
Although Africa might not feature prominently on his agenda, Trump’s first administration did push for trade deals with select African countries, suggesting a preference for bilateral engagement. He’s also explicitly linked trade to strategic partnerships, so countries not aligned with US security goals could face reduced support under Agoa.
In contrast, under President Joe Biden and potentially Vice-President Kamala Harris, democracy and human rights would likely remain central to US foreign policy. The Biden administration has already expelled countries like Niger, Gabon and Uganda from Agoa for governance issues, reflecting an increasingly security-driven and rights-based approach to African trade relations.
Agoa eligibility requires countries to meet certain governance and human rights standards, and Harris would likely bolster enforcement of these. Her agenda may also focus on climate action and sustainable development, which could influence how Agoa is framed or updated, with possible incentives for African countries to focus on green industries and sustainable trade practices. Harris may also push for Agoa initiatives that support Africa’s digital infrastructure, with incentives for US tech firms investing in the continent.
Zooming out, Harris might view strengthening African economies through trade as key to long-term global stability. This could see an expanded or modified Agoa, ensuring it plays a role in countering violent extremism, instability and economic fragility in regions of strategic importance to the US. However, despite these differences, both sides of the political aisle are guided by the same nationalistic impulses.
Where does this leave African countries? With Agoa set to expire in 2025, its extension is no longer a formality. The act might not be renewed in its current form, or could be revised to better align with US security and economic priorities. Whether Agoa is renewed or replaced will depend on how Africa fits into the US’ geopolitical and geo-economic strategy.
Several scenarios are worth considering.
First, there’s the possibility of maintaining the status quo with only minor changes to the existing policy. However, Washington’s political climate suggests a “business-as-usual” approach is unlikely to suffice. US legislators have already raised concerns about the eligibility of certain African countries under the programme.
Trade Minister Tau confident US will renew South Africa’s Agoa membership
South Africa’s foreign policy stances on Russia and China have come under scrutiny, with some members of Congress, such as senators Chris Coons and Jim Risch, questioning its continued inclusion in Agoa. They even lobbied to move the Agoa Forum away from South Africa and reconsider its benefits.
In this context, Washington could adopt a more adversarial stance, imposing stricter conditions related to governance, security and strategic positioning. This might result in the withdrawal of preferential access for African nations aligning too closely with China.
Second, rather than renewing Agoa in its current form, there may be a continued US shift towards bilateral trade agreements with select African nations, particularly those seen as strategic partners. This could lead to a more fragmented trade relationship with Africa.
Countries whose agendas complement US domestic manufacturing, supply chain security and economic resilience will emerge as winners. In contrast, those with economic policies perceived as incompatible with US priorities could face adverse consequences.
Third, the US perceiving Africa as increasingly under China’s influence could see Agoa being reassessed.
On the positive side, an updated and modernised approach might strengthen US-Africa ties. A new framework focusing on sustainability, innovation and inclusive development is arguably overdue.
Revising Agoa to target sectors representing Africa’s future economic potential – such as clean energy, digital services and value-added manufacturing – could be constructive. Adding an investment component would offer a more compelling counterweight to Beijing’s influence, tying into Washington’s broader industrial policy.
Furthermore, ensuring that smaller or less-developed African nations can take better advantage of trade preferences would address criticisms of the programme.
The diplomatic and policy dilemma facing the next US administration is significant. A substantial Agoa reform, rather than dismantling, seems the most likely outcome. Reforming the programme to better align with US priorities – while also addressing Africa’s aspirations – would ensure that trade remains a meaningful pillar of US-Africa relations for years to come.
